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The main reason
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OF LAW IN PAKISTAN

why the muslims

of undivided

Dr. Nasim Hasan

Shah*

India demanded

Paki-

stan was that they wished to have a State where they could live according to
their own cultural values, traditions and laws. It was basically on this account
that the muslims of the sub-continent
rallied round the cause of Pakistan and
accorded it such enthusiastic
support that Mr. J innah was impelled to say:
"Our religion, our culture and our Islamic ideals are our driving force to achieve
our independence."
This goal of independence was ultimately achieved on 14th
August, 1947 and a new sovereign State appeared on the map of the world:
Pakistan - the homeland of Islam, a country whose people yearned to live and
to be governed under the regime of Islamic laws.
However, achieving Pakistan was one thing but introducing Islamic law
for its governance therein was quite anotoer. Many difficult and complex questions immediately
arose which required a satisfactory answer before the process of Islamisation
of Pakistan
could be initiated in any significant way:
What is the true intent of the laws of Islam on questions
Riba, Hudood, rights of women, etc. ?
Is it possible
20th Century

to administer
?

a State based on Islamic

such as

laws in the

Would not the introduction
of Islamic laws, which some considered to be medieval, harsh and brutal, constitute a barrier to all
progress and modernity?
Accordingly,
to introduce Islamic laws in the polity very small steps
were taken in the beginning and only modest measures like the West Punjab
Muslim Personal Laws (Shariat Application)
Act, 1948, etc., directed mainly
to curtail the operation of customary laws, were introduced.
However, many scholars of Islam did not agree with this cautious approach and pleaded for speedier action. In their speeches and addresses they
argued that Islamic law was sufficiently
dynamic and elastic to tackle the
problems of the modern age and was quite capable of dealing adequately with
them (one such address was delivered by Maulana
Abul Ala Maududi at the
University Law College, Lahore on 6th January, 1948, on the question of the
Constitution
& Law in Islam, when the author was studying there).

*

Retd.

Chief

Justice

of Pakistan.
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On 7th March, 1949, Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan, the then Prime Minister of
Pakistan, moved the 'Objectives Resolution' in the Constituent Assembly wherein
he removed all doubts as to the ideals and objectives of the new State and
pledged that its Constitution
would be based on the principles of Islam. He
said inter-alia:
"Pakistan was founded because muslims of this subcontinent wanted
to build up their lives in accordance with the teachings and traditions of Islam, because they wanted to demonstrate
to the world
that Islam provides a panacea to the many diseases which have
crept into the life of humanity today."
Mr. Liaquat
Ali Khan (while moving the Resolution
stituent Assembly
of March 7, 1949).
In this Resolution

it was inter-alia

in the Con-

observed:

"Whereas sovereignty
over the entire universe belongs to Allah
almighty alone and the authority which he has delegated to the
State of Pakistan, through its people for being exercised within
the limits prescribed by him is a sacred trust;
This Constituent
Assembly representing
the people
resolves to frame a Constitution
for the sovereign
State of Pakistan;
Wherein the State shall exercise its powers
the chosen representatives
of the people;

of Pakistan
independent

and authority

through

Wherein the principles of democracy, freedom, equality, tolerance
and social justice as enunciated by Islam shall be fully observed;
Wherein the muslims shall be enabled to order their lives in the
individual and collective spheres in accordance with the teachings
and requirements
of Islam as set out in the Holy Quran and the
Sunnah:
Wherein adequate provision shall be made for the minorities
profess and practice their religions and develop their cultures;

to

Wherein adequate provision
shall be made to safeguard the legitimate interest of minorities and backward
and depressed classes;
Wherein

the independence

of the Judiciary

shall be fully secured;

So that the people of Pakistan may prosper and attain their rightful and honoured place amongst the nations of the World and
make their full contribution towards international peace and progress
and happiness of humanity."
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The first Constitution of Pakistan framed by the Constituent
Assembly,
after considerable
delay, came into force on 23rd March, 1956 and the 'Objectives Resolution' formed the preamble thereto.
In this Constitution a chapter was included entitled' Islamic Provisions'.
Under these provisions all existing laws were to be brought in conformity with
the injunctions of Islam as laid down in the Holy Quran and Sunnah (referred
to as injunctions
of Islam) and they further laid down that no law shall be
enacted in future which is repugnant to such in junctions.
They further provided for the selling up of an Advisory Council
of
Islamic Ideology to make recommendations
as to the measures that were required for bringing existing laws in conformity with the injunctions
of Islam
and also recommend the stages by which such measures should be brought into
effect.
However, despite these provisions not much progress was made to bring
the laws in the country in conformity with the injunctions of Islam during the
first 30 years of the creation of Pakistan. Thus, although the first Constitution
was adopted in March, 1956 by the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan nothing
much was actually done in this respect during the period in which this Constitution remained in force, namely upto 7th October, 1958. Again in the Constitution of 1962 a provision for the creation of an Advisory Council of Islamic
Ideology to examine all laws then in force with a view to bringing them into
conformity with the teachings and requirements of Islam was made. But nothing much could be achieved. One reason was that by Article 6( 1) thereof,
the
responsibility
for deciding whether a proposed law was violative of or was not
in accordance
with the said principles was placed upon the legislature
concerned. Consequently
neither the High Courts nor the Supreme Court had any
responsibility
in the matter of determining
whether any law did in fact violate or was otherwise not in conformity with the Holy Quran and Sunnah.
Accordingly
this provision was more in the nature of a manifesto for the law
makers rather than a binding obligation enforceable
by courts of law. Similarly, even though the Constitution
of 1973 did again make provisions
for
bringing all existing laws in conformity with the injunctions of Islam as laid
down in the Holy Quran and Sunnah but there too the implementation
of this
objective was made the responsibility
of the Legislature
(vide Article 227)
and no power was conferred for its enforcement on the superior judiciary.
The Islamisation process actually received a fillip when Gen. Muhammad
Zia-ul-Haq
took over in July, 1977, the administration
of the country.
Soon
after assuming office, he made a statement that courts will be empowered to
strike down all laws of the country that are repugnant to the Holy Quran and
Sunnah and declare them as null and void.

Shariat

To achieve this objective, on 2nd December, 1978, a 'Superior Courts
Benches Order' was promulgated
which was to take effect on 12th
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Rabi-ul-AlVwal
1399 A.H,- 10th February, 1979. This date is very impOflarll in
the present context as on this very date the Hudood laws, which I will refer to
a bit later were also enforced.
In pursuance of the 'Superior Courts Shariat Benches Order' five Shari at
Benches were constituted, one in each High Court (Lahore. Peshawar, Karachi
and Quetta) and one in the Supreme Court (Appellate Shariat Bench) at Rawalpindi/
Islamabad. These Shariat Benches were empowered to strike down all existing
and future laws, with the exception of the Constitution,
muslim personal law,
any law relating to the procedure of the courts or tribunals or any fiscal law
relating to the collection of taxes and fees on banking or insurance practice
and procedure until the expiration of 3 years from the Constitution
Amendment (Order) 1979, (this period was later extended to 10 years), that are repugnant to Islam. The Shariat Benches were empowered. in cases where they held
that an existing or future law was un-Islamic to declare to what extent it was
repugnant to the injunctions of Islam and how best it could be reshaped in
order to make it consistent with the relevant injunctions
of the Holy Quran
and Sunnah, which orders the Government was bound to implement.
Later. 011 27th May, 1980 the four Shariat Benchcs of the High Courts
were replaced by establishing
a Federal Shariat Court at the Capital of Pakistan, Islamabad.
This was to consist of 5 Judges and three traditional U/emas,
well versed in Islamic law,
In March, 1982 the powers of the federal Shariat Court were enhanced
so as to become authoriscd suo 1II0lu to take up examination of any law over
which it has jurisdiction
to recommend
amendments
thercin, in accordance
with injunctions of the Holy Quran, The conferment of such a power of judicial review. with a view to Islamising the existing laws, has no parallel in
judicial history. No such power was conferred on courts during the muslim
rule when Islamic FiqlJ was the governing law, The essence of Shari' ah laws
was that they were prepared by jurists of high calibre having deep knowledge
of Shari 'all and their efforts were confined mainly to selling forth legal alternatives in given situations which were in conformity with the Holy Quran and
the Sunnah of the Holy Prophet (P.B. U. II. ) and when any situation
arose in
a disputed involving some such questions their fatwa was
adopted
and the
decision of the case based thereon. Their fat was were accepted by the rulers
and the governed alike and their declarations of the law were enforced by the
courts without interference by the rulers. But the jurisdiction
conferred here
was altogether
different. The Federal Shariat Court and the Shariat Appellate
Bench of the Supreme Court in Pakistan were conferred the powcr to declare
any law presently in force as ineffective in case it is found to violate an
injunction of the Quran or the Sunnah. This power was exercisable hoth where
a matter was brought by a party before the Federal Sharial Court or was taken
up by it suo 1/Iotu. This indeed was a most awesome and far reaching power,
without any parallel in the history of the Islamic world and also a very potent
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instrument
for accomplishing
the process of Islamisation
of laws within the
shortest possible
period. This power was, in fact, availed of fully both by the
Federal Shariat Court and tbe Shariat Appellate Bench of the Supreme Court
for bringing about the Islamisation of existing laws. Indeed as a result of the
decisions of these courts and the consequential
steps taken to implement them,
a silent revolution has come about in the legal field. Reference to some of
the more important decisions in this respect will be made a little later. In the
meanwhile I may advert to the Hudood laws promulgated at the same time as
the superior Courts Shariat Benches Order was promulgated.
HUDOOD

LAWS

On 12th of Rabi-ul-Awwal1399
A.H. (lOth February, 1979) the President of Pakistan promulgated a Presidential Order and 3 Ordinances, amending
the Pakistan Penal Code relating to certain offences affecting property of the
people and moral and social order of the society, so as to bring it in conformity with the Holy Quran and the Sunnah. These Ordinances and Order were
the following:
(i)

Prohibition

(Enforcement

of Hadd) Order, 1979

Whereby the existing provisions in the Penal Code pertaining to prohibition of intoxicants including alcoholic liquor were amended and these offences
classified into two categories namely, offence liable to hadd as laid down in
fiqah, but where the standard of proof, as provided for lJadd, was not available (or the offence, say of being drunk and disorderly was committed by a
non-muslim)
it became an offence liable to la:;ir.
(ii)

Offences

against

Property

(Enforcement

of Hudood)

Ordinance,

1979

The main offences covered by this Ordinance were theft (sarqa) and
robbery/dacoity
(haraabah). Here too Iladd is imposable only if the proof of
the offence as laid down in the fiqall is not forth-coming,
otherwise the punishment of theft will be liable to tazir as already provided in the Pakistan
Penal Code.
(Ui) The Offence

of Zina (Enforcement

of Hudood)

Ordinance,

1979

This Ordinance deals with the offences of fornication,
adultery, rape,
unnatural offence and certain other allied offences and hadd or tazir is imposable
on the same principles, as mentioned above.
(iv) Offence

of Qazf (Enforcement

of Hadd) Ordinance,

1979

Qazf i.e. false imputation of zina. This piece of legislation
with lian i.e. the accusation of adultery made hy a husband against

also deals
his wife.
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I do not propose to go into further details of these statutes as they can
be the subject maLler of a full lecture by themselves. Suffice it is to say that
for crimes which have far reaching affects on society, the right of an individual according to Islam is subservient to the right of society or the State.
The hadd punishments have been provided to ensure preservation of the values
that Islam upholds for the dignity of human society.
Furthermore,
Islamic
punishments
also imply the spiritual purification
of the human and an expiation for the world hereafter, which is absent in any other legal system.
COUNCIL

OF ISLAMIC

IDEOLOGY

A body called the Islamic Ideology was established
even before the
preceding important measures, that have been referred to above were taken.
This body was charged with the duty of examining the laws enacted during the
British rule and even after the creation of Pakistan, to see whether any provision repugnant to the injunctions
of Islam existed
therein. Accordingly,
a
large number of laws in force in Pakistan were examined and the Council
made recommendations
to amend several laws which
contained provisions
repugnant to the injunctions of Islam. It is on the basis of one such recommendation that the existing Evidence Act of 1872 was repealed in 1984 by the
Qanoon-e-Shahadat
Order (Order X of 1984) to make the law of evidence
entirely consistent with the injunctions of Islam.
But the greatest
impact on the legal system has been brought about by
the decisions rendered by the Federal Shariat Court and the Shariat Appellate
Bench of the Supreme Court. Some of these may briefly be refcrred to hereunder:
a)

Restrictions

Imposed

by Customary

Laws-Invalid

An important decision in this connection,
which
has affected a very
large section of the population in the Punjab is the declaration that the customary law in the Punjab which imposed restrictions on the right of disposal of
ancestral
agricultural
land is un-Islamic.
Under the customary law of the
Punjab, the power of landowners
to dispose of ancestral properties was restricted as distinguished
from self acquired properties which they could dispose of without restrictions.
The Court declared that Islam does no recognize
any such distinction between ancestral and non-ancestral
property and the distinction created in this connection
by customary law was abhorrent
to the
injunctions
of Islam and could not, therefore, be upheld (Federation of Pakistan v. Mohammad Ishaque, PLD 1083 S. C. 273).
b) No Retirement

Without

Show Cause Notice

Another important question, which came up before the Shariat Courts,
was whether a civil servant who had completed 25 years of service qualifying
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for pension could be retired, in public interest, without issuance
cause notice, as provided for in the Civil Servants Acts of 1973.

of

show

It was held by the majority of the Shariat Appellate Dench of the Supreme Court that the provisions of the Civil Servants Act, 1973, which enabled
the government
to retire civil servants after
completing
25 years
service was unfair and against the injunctions of Islam as it ran counter
to the
concept of complete justice in Islam. It was pointed out that in tlle Quran and
Sunnah great emphasis has been laid on doing undiluted justice and that adl,
qist and ihsan are the essential components of total and complete justice in
Islam, according to which not only equal treatment between man and man is
required but protection is also afforded against unfair treatment (Pakistan &
other v. Public at Large, PLD 1987 S.C. 304).

c) Punjab and NWFP Pre-Emption Acts Inconsistent
tions

with Islamic Injunc-

A large number of provisions of Punjab Pre-emption Act (l of 1913) and
the North-West
Frontier Province Pre-emption
Act (XIV of 1960) have also
been found by the Shariat Appellate Dench of the Supreme Court to be against
the injunctions of Islam as these provisions were based on the customary rules
which were not consistent with the Islamic injunctions.
Thus, in a field where
a great deal of litigation is conducted both in the Punjab and N.W.F.P., Islamic
principles has now become the governing rule (Government of NWFP v. Said
Kamal Shah, PLD 1986 S.C. 360).

(d) Decisions of Court Martial are Appealable
I now come to a decision which is of great importance to members of
the defence forces. The question involved was whether the provisions of Section 133 of the Army Act (XXXI of 1952), Section 140 of the Pakistan Navy
Ordinance (XXXV of 1961) and Section 162 of the Pakistan Air Force Act
(VI of 1953) which debarred persons sentenced by court martial from preferring
appeals against decisions rendered by them were not contrary to the
injunctions of Islam?
The Supreme Court observed that the bar to filing an appeal against the
sentences passed by the court martial was not only against the concept of
complete justice in Islam but also suffered from an inconsistency.
It was
noted that the authorities
had conferred the right of appeal in hudood cases
and went on to observe that if discipline of the forces was not affected by
conferment
of this right in such cases hardly any justification
existed in the
plea that this would be affected by conferment of right of appeal against
conviction for other criminal offences. Accordingly, the provisions of Section
133 of the Pakistan Army Act, Section 162 of the Pakistan Air Force Act and
Section 140 of the Pakistan Navy Ordinance denying to an aggrieved person
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the right of appeal were found to be repugnant to the injunctions of Islam and
it was ordered that the necessary consequential
amendments be carried out in
these provisions to confer the right of appeal to such persons against the judgments of the Court Martial in cases other than these relating 10 the offence
covered by hudood laws (Pakistan through
Secretary Ministry oJ Defence v.
The General Public. PLD 1998 S. C. 8).
(e) Freedom

of the Press

Another decision, which has advanced the cause of the liberty of press
and publication is the judgment rendered in Ihe case of Federation of Pakistan
& others v. Public at Large & others, P.L.D. 1988 S.C. 202. Herein the Shariat
Appellate Bench declared the provisions of the West Pakistan Press and Publications Ordinance, 1963 to be against the injunctions of the Quran and Sunnah.
In this case, while declaring the provisions of this Ordinance to be un-Islamic,
it was observed that [slam favours every practical activity and holds in great
esteem persons engaged in every kind of work and views with disfavour all
those who burden others with their maintenance, because in an Islamic polity
every man should strive to' maintain himself by the product of his own effort
and labour.
Hence no undue and unreasonable
interference
or impediment
should be placed on his desire to run a printing press or start a newspaper or
journal.
Accordingly
the impediments
existing in the Ordinance of 1963 in
this regard were found to un-Islamic and declared to be of no legal effect.
(f) Doctrine

of Caveat Emptor

is un-Islamic

The Shariat Appellate Bench has also ruled in Federation of Pakistan v.
Public at Large. 19X8 S. C. M. R. 2041, that the doctrine of caveat emptor is
not valid in Islam because in Islam the seller is under an obligation to himself
disclose to the buyer the defects that exist in his goods or in his property even
without being questioned specifically in regard thereto by the buyer.
(g) Murder

becomes

compoundable

Perhaps the judgment having the greatest general impact, relating to the
administration
of criminal justice was the judgment delivered in the case of
Federation of Pakistan through Secretary.
Ministry of Law and another
v.
Gul Hasan Khan,
P.L.D. 1989 Supreme
Court 633, wherein
the Shariat
Appellate Bench of the Supreme Court
while
deciding
different appeals
against a consolidated judgment of the Federal Shariat Court, held that:
The Court,
that:
(1)

for reasons

Section

separately

recorded,

299 to 338 of the Pakistan

wilh offences against human
tions of Islam as they -

has unanimously

Penal Code,

body are

repugnant

decided

1860 which deal
to the injunc-
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(a)

<,10not provide for the Qi sas in cases of Qat l-a1- amd (deliberate murder) and 1urool1 -a 1- amd (deliberately
causing
hurt) as is prescribed in the Holy Quran and Sunnah;

(b)

do not provide for Diyat in cases of Shibh -lll-amd and
khata of both Qat! (Murder) and Jllrh (hurt) as prescribed
in the Holy Quran and Sunnah;

(c)

do not provide for compromise between the parties on agreed
compensation
when they make Sll!h (compromise)
in case
of Qatl and JurlJ;

(d)

do not provide that the offender
may be pardoned
victim in cases of JurlJ (hurt), and by the heirs of the
in cases of Qat! (murder) whereby the court can only
him a selllence of imprisonment
by way of Ta'zir
may not extend to imprisonment
for life;

(e)

do not exempt a non-pubert and an insane offender
sentence of death in case of murder; and

(0

do not define the different kinds of Qat! and 1urh (murder
and hurt) in accordance with their respective punishments
prescribed in the Holy Quran and S unnah.

by the
victim
award
which

from the

(2)

Section 109 of Pakistan Penal Code, 1860 is repugnant
to the
injunctions
of Islam in so far as it makes an abettor in case of
murder and other offences against human body liable to the same
punishment as is prescribed for the murder or for such offences
regardless of the various degrees of abetment.

(3)

Section
54 of Pakistan Penal Code and section 401, 402, 402-A
and 402-B of the Code of Criminal Procedure are repugnant
to
the injunctions of Islam in so far as they empower the Central
Government
or a Provincial government
to commute the sentence of death in case of Qat! -a1- amd or 111rh-ll1-amd or in any
other offence violating the HllqOOq -lll- [bad.

(4)

Section
345 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 is repugnant to the injunctions of Islam in so far it does not include some
of the offences against human body in the table of compoundable
offences.

(5)

Section 381 of the code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 is repugnant
to the injunctions of Islam in so far as it does not provide that the
heirs of the deceased in a case of murder may pardon the offender
or enter into a compromise
with him even at the last moment

National
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upon which execution

[1996
cannot

take

No declaration in respect of Section 133 of the Evidence Act is
called for as it already stands repealed by the Qanun-e-Shahadat,

1984.
(7)

Section 337 to 339-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure are
declared to be repugnant to the injunctions of Islam in so far as
they permit tender of pardon to an offender without reference to
and without permission of the victim wherever this is required
under the inj unctions of Islam in case of Jurh and of the heirs of
the victim in cases of Qatl.

(8)

Accordingl y, it is held that this decision shall take effect from
23rd of March, 1990 whereby the provisions referred to above, to
the extent they have been held to be repugnant to the injunctions
of Islam, shall cease to have effect.

In the wake of that decision of the Shariat Appellate Bench of the
Supreme court of Pakistan the President of Pakistan was pleased to promulgate Criminal Law (Amendment) Ordinance, 1990 (Ordinance IV of 1990) and
Criminal Law (Second Amendment)
Ordinance,
1990 (Ordinance
VII of
1990), whereby the provisions
of the Code of Criminal Procedure and the
Pakistan Penal Code declared by the Shariat Appellate
Bench of the Supreme
Court of Pakistan to be repugnant to the injunctions of Islam were substituted
by other
provisions
in conformity
with the Islamic Injunctions.
Popularly
known as the law of Qisas and Diyat, that law is now in force in Pakistan and •
the same provides for compoundability
of all cases of offences against
human body (including murder and hurt), specifies various classes and categories of murder and hurt and prescribes different punishments for the same,
and also provides for monetary compensation
to be given to the victim or his
heirs in accordance with the Islamic criminal law.
The effect of this decision along with the laws relating to the enforcement of hudood promulgated
earlier have resulted in rendering the laws of
Pakistan in relation to punishment of offences quite consistent
with the injunctions of Islam.

(h) Prescription of maximum ceiling of land owner holding for an individual owner is un-Islamic
This is another land mark
ruling of the Shariat Appellate Bench of the
Supreme Court and was handed over on 10-8- 1989. It has held the provisions
of the Land Reforms Regulation of 1972 and the Land Reforms Act of 1977
whereby
the maximum holding which a landowner could own and provided
for the vesting of all land in excess of the aforesaid ceiling in the Government
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to be un-Islamic and struck down these restrictions
which were found to be
against the injunctions of Islam (Qazalbash Wakf v. Chief Land Commissioner
Punjab, PLD 1990 S.C. 199).
(i) Riba- (Interest

and Mark up : un- Islamic)

The provisions of several statutes which provided for payment of interest (Riba) have been found to be invalid by the Federal Shariat Court. Such
provisions
existed in the following statutes:
(i)

Interest

Act (XXXII of 1839)

(ii)

Government

(iii)

Negotiable

(iv)

Land

(v)

Civil Procedure

(vi)

Co- operative

(vii)

Insurance

(viii)

State Bank of Pakistan

Savings

Bank Act (V of 1873)

Instruments

Acquisition

Act

(XXXVI

of 1881)

Act (I of 1894)
Code (V of

Societies

1908)

Act (VII of 1925)

Act (IV of 1938)
Act (XXXIII

of 1956)

Provisions therein relating
to purchase of bills and other commercial instruments like, debentures bonds etc. on basis of interest.
(ix)

W.P. Money Landers

Ordinance

(x)

Agricultural

(xi)

Banking

(xii)

Banking

(xiii)

Banks (Nationalisation)

(xiv)

Banking Companies

Development

Companies

(XXIV of 1960)

Bank Rules, 1961

Ordinance

Companies

(LVII of 1962)

Rules, 1963
Payment

(Recovery

of Compensation

of Loans) Ordinance

Rules,

1974

(XIX of 1979)

That which provided for payment of interest were found repugnant
to
the injunctions of Islam. It was also found that the mark-up system, introduced in Sections 79 and 80 of the Negotiable
Instruments
Act, 1881 being
similar to Riba, as it permitted an excesses on the principal amount, was also
repugnant to and was violative of the injunctions of Islam. The Court ordered
that the word "Interest"
wherever it occurred in these enactments
shall be
deleted by 30th June, 1992. The operation of this decision has, however, been
suspended by the Shariat Appellate Bench of the Supreme
Court, where the
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appeal against it, is still pending (Mahmoodur
of Law etc., PLD 1992 F.S. C. 1).

Rehman

[1996
Faisal

v. Secretary

Ministry

RIGHTS

OF WOMEN

Considerable progress in the sorry state of women in our society, has
been secured, strangely as it may seem, through utilisation of Islamic provisions. Pursuant to the mandate of the Constitution that all laws that are repugnant to the Quran and Sunnah will be invalid and that henceforth decisions of
courts are to be based on the injunctions of Islam, Islamic law has become
the rule of decision in practically all matters. It needs mention that the guarantee of equality of status conferred upon women by Article 25 of the Constitution is also being fully enforced by our Courts but as many of us are not
aware of all this; hence it would be profitable to refer to some leading decisions of the courts on this subject.
As far as Islamisation of laws is concerned, all customary laws which
denied the right of inheritance to females in respect of agricultural property
have been repealed withe the result that now every heir, male or female, is
entitled to his or her share as fixed by the Shariat with absolute property
rights therein vesting in them including complete right of disposing it off.
Considering that 75% of our population lives in rural areas and was being
governed by customary laws, this is indeed a revolutionary change. A remarkable example of this revolutionary change is manifest from how these matters
are now being viewed by the courts. Thus in the case of Sardar Ali v. Ghulam
Sarwar (PLD 1990 S. C. 1), decided recently by the Supreme Court, the facts
were that the brothers had been in possession of the land of their sister and had
excluded her completely from it. Later on, they claimed that they had become
owners of the land through adverse possession. This claim was negatived by
the Supreme Court in a landmark ruling wherein the rights of women and their
status in an Islamic Society was discussed in great detail and it was held,
relying on the Quranic verse in Sura IV Verse 34 declaring man as "protectors
and maintainers" that the petitioners being the brothers of the respondent
were required by the Islamic law to protect the property rights of their sister if
ever they came into possession of her land in any capacity. The Court went
on to observe that "one who is enjoined with the protection of the other's
property cannot lay claim adverse to the interests and rights of that other one
who owns it". No brother can now usurp the share of his sister on the ground
that she has relinquished it in his favour or he has become its owner through
adverse possession.
Again, differing from the earlier view held by the courts in pre-partition India that a wife is entitled to claim dissolution of marriage only if she
has been treated with cruelty by her husband, or she has not been maintained
by him for two years or that his whereabouts have become unknown or that
he is impotent; it has now been held by courts in Pakistan that "in case of
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dislike by the wife of her husband, Islam concedes the right to the wife, in
circumstances of extreme discord and where life becomes a torture for both,
on account of the fixed aversion on the part of the spouses, to seek dissolution
of marriage on the ground of khula". Accordingly, the court can order separation by khula even if the husband is not agreeable to that course" (Abdul
Rahim v. Mst. Shahida
Khan, PLD 1984 S.C. 329). In the same strain our
courts have declared that if there is disagreement between the husband and a
wife, who is sui juris, she cannot be forced to live with her husband and is
entitled to live separately from him (Mst. Sahi Bibi v. Khalid Hussain, 1973
S. C. M. R. 577).
The wife's right to visit and live with her parents has been established
in another case in somewhat unusual circumstances. A husband was refusing
to allow his wife to see her parents or to visit them and had practically locked
her in the house. Her mother, therefore, presented a habeas corpus petition to
the High Court to obtain her release, but the husband resisted the execution of
this order. However, the bailiff was able to recover the wife by securing the
assistance of the police but the husband succeeded in forcibly snatching from
the arms of the mother, the minor son who was 2 or 3 years of age. The wife,
in these circumstances was produced alone before the Court and on her
statement that she was being confined by her husband illegally, was set at
liberty and allowed to go with her mother. This shows that a married woman
cannot be forced to live with her husband against her will. Reverting to this
case, I may mention that a few days later the minor was also recovered and
brought before the Court and the learned Judge entrusted the custody of the
little boy to the mother, on the principle that the High Court (in this case the
Lahore High Court )as a Court of Record and patria potestas over minors,
was empowered to entrust a minor child in the custody of his mother, where
such minor child has been snatched awa¥ from her lawful custody (Sakina
Bibi v. Muhammad Aslam, 1987 P. Cr. L.J. 377).
The solicitude and sympathy which Courts in Pakistan exhibit for the
female sex is again evident from the case of Ghazala Yamin. Herein, consequent to a dispute between the spouses resulting in their separation, the wife
had agreed to give the custody of their female child to the husband. But later
on, she instituted proceedings claiming her custody. The husband, naturally
relied upon the agreement entered into by the parties at the time of separation.
The High Court of Sind disregarding the agreement executed by the mother
giving up the custody of her minor child held that such an agreement did not
disentitle the mother to claim custody because the Guardian Judge must,
notwithstanding such an agreement pass appropriate orders which are for the
welfare of the minor and it was for the welfare of the minor girl that she
should remain with her mother (Ghazala Yamin v. Muhammad Yamin, NLR
1988 C. L. J. 315). Our courts, in a series of cases, have also held that major
women cannot be detained in the Dar-ul- Ama'J without their consent even
though their parents and brothers do not wish her to go back to the man she
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has married, without their consent (Farman Ullan v. D.M. Sukkur, 1975 P.Cr.
L.J.472),
or where her parents and brothers are prepared to keep her despite
her release from jail after serving sentence under the Zina Ordinance even
though it is apprehended
that in the circumstances
she may go back to her
paramour (Noor Hussain v. Superintendent
Darul Aman, PU 1988 Lah. 422).
The sentiments of women with regard to the said Ordinance and other
Hudood laws are well known and one can appreciate their reasons for agitating
against them. But here also the courts have tried to soften the rigour of some
of the provisions of these laws. So far as the conflict between various provisions of the Muslim
Family Laws Ordinance and the Zina Ordinance
is
concerned,
the ameliorative
provision
of the family laws that where a man
decides to divorce his wife he must send verbal or written intimation
of
divorce to his wife and also to get it registered with the Local Union Council
to enable attempts at reconciliation
between
the spouses and the divorce will
become
effective only after ninety days
if these efforts failed, have rebounded against women
under the Zina Ordinance because very often husbands disregard these provisions and divorce
their wives without getting the
divorce
registered
with the Union Council.
Due to ignorance of the law,
women believing that they stand divorced
contract a second marriage
after
the pronouncement
of divorce by the husband although the marriage is legally
still subsisting and after contracting a second marriage
begin living with the
second husband.
This amount to admission of zina with another man. Taking
advantage of this legal lacunae
the husband
who made the invalid divorce
then perversely
files a complaint of zina against his ex-wife and her new
husband and gets them both arrested.
To prevent perpetration of such injustices it has now been held by the courts that where a wife bona-fide believing
that her previous marriage
with her former husband stands dissolved on the
basis of a talaqnama although the husband has not got it registered with the
Union Council enters into a second marriage, neither this second marriage nor
the fact of her living with the second husband will amount to zina because of
her bona-fide belief that her first marriage stood
dissolved.
It has been
observed that where the wife did not take a second husband deliberately
or
with guilty intention i.e. without any mens rea neither the wife nor her second
husband will be liable under
the Zina (Hudood)
Ordinance
(Bashiran v.
Muhammad Hussain,
PLD 1988 S. C. 186).
Similarly,
the criticism levelled by women that their evidence is not
regarded as admissible
in matters of Hudood & Qisas has been remedied by
the judgment
of the Federal Shariat Court.
This judgment incidentally
has
been given in the Shariat Petitions filed by the President,
Pakistan Woman
Laws Association
in the case entitled Begum Rashida Patel v. Federation of
Pakistan,
(PLD 1989 F. S. C. 95), and it has been held that evidence of
women is definitely admissible at least insofar as imposition of Taazir punish-

ments are concerned.
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In addition to the rights accruing to women by Islamisation
of laws,
the attempt to secure status of equality for them has also been fortified by
Article 25 of the Constitution.
This provides that All citizens
tion of law

are equal before law and are entitled

to equal protec-

And goes on to add thatThere shall be no discrimination
And to further
vided that-

safeguard

the rights

on the basis of sex alone
of women

and children,

it is pro-

Nothing in this Article shall prevent the State from making
special provision for the protection of women and children.

any

The Supreme Court has explained the scope and intent of this Article in the recent case relating to admission of girls to Medical Colleges as
follows :No discrimination
on the ground of sex alone can be permitted
except on the ground
of reasonable and intelligible
classification. Such classification
in our society permits for the present,
establishment
of educational and professional
institutions
exclusively for the females or exclusively
for the males.
However,
where co-education
is permitted and the institution
is not reserved for one sex alone, the fixation of number on the ground of
sex will directly be opposed to the requirement
of Article 25 (2)
unless it is justified as a protective measure for women and children under Article 25(3).
In other words the number of girls
students can be fixed as the minimum but not as the maximum
particularly
so where on merit they are likely to get more than
the fixed number of seats.
The Constitution
assumes that the
women and children
in our society need protection and not the
males and as long as the Constitution
mentions that assumption
and basis, we cannot reverse it by affording protection to males
and adults at the cost of women and children.
That would be
opposed
The conclusion

to the very fundamental
was expressed

mandate

of the Constitution.

thus-

In view of the discussion that has proceeded on
of the girl students merited
acceptance on the
have been discriminated
against in the matter of
educational
medical colleges suppressing
their
the boys admitted thereto.

merits, the claim
ground that they
admission to comerit as against
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And admission to co- educational medical colleges was allowed strictly
on merit, while maintaining tbe right of girls to exclusive admission to tbe
girl medical colleges (like Fatima Jinnab Medical College for Girls) (Shirin
Munir v. Government of the Punjab, PLD 1990 S. C. 295 ).
LEGISLATION

Enforcement

of Shari 'ah Act, 1991:

Tbe Legislature (National Assembly of Pakistan) not lagging behind
bas passed an Act delivering the supremacy of Shari' ah as " the supreme law
of Pakistan" and mandated that all laws are to be interpreted in tbe light of
Shari 'ah; all Muslim citizens are to observe Shari 'ah; teaching of and
training in Shari' ah to be arranged by the State; tbe educational and economic
systems in tbe country are to be Islamitized; the mass media is to promote
Islamic values; steps are to be taken by tbe State to protect life, liberty and
property of the citizens , to eliminate bribery and corruption, to eradicate
obscenity, vulgarity and other social evils; the State is to establish a Nizami-Adl and Bait-ul- mal (Welfare Fund); the State is to protect the ideology of
Pakistan and safeguard the citizens against false imputations, etc. However,
tbis Act gave protection to the present political and governmental systems,
tbe rights guaranteed to women and the non-muslims by or under the Constitution, tbe international financial obligations and other existing obligations of
tbe state. Some of tbese protective provisions of tbis Act had been cballenged before tbe Federal Shariat Court which declared those provisions to be
repugnant to the injunctions of Islam (Muhammad Ismail Qureshy v. Federal
Government of Pakistan, 1992 F. S. C. 445).
However, tbat matter is still sub judice as the State's appeal before the
Shariat Appellate Bench of the Supreme Court of Pakistan is yet to be taken up
for bearing and decision.
CONCLUSION

Tbe factual position today, therefore, is that practically all the laws in
force in Pakistan have been brought in accord with the Islamic injunctions.
Accordingly, from the formal aspect, an Islamic polity bas been established.
Wbat remains is the will of its inhabitants to act witb and conform the will
of its inhabitants to act with and conform their conduct to tbe Islamic precepts: This is easier said than done. An Urdu couplet which sums up the
situation quite aptly may roughly be translated as follows:
The believers fired by their zeal succeeded in bu}lding a mosg,ue
just in one night;

Vol. 8]

Islamisation

of Law in Pakistan

But being sinners at heart, could not become namazis
pers) even in years.
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(worship-

The question whether the Pakistanis will be able to succeed in establishing an Islamic order in Pakistan is, therefore, a question which only the future
can answer.

